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ABSTRACT
Requirements specications for high assurance secure sys-
tems are rare in the open literature. This paper presents a
case study in the development of a requirements document
for a multilevel secure system that must meet stringent as-
surance and evaluation requirements. The system is secure,
yet combines popular commercial components with special-
ized high assurance ones. Functional and non-functional
requirements pertinent to security are discussed. A multi-
dimensional threat model is presented. The threat model
accounts for the developmental and operational phases of
system evolution and for each phase accounts for both phys-
ical and non-physical threats. We describe our team-based
method for developing a requirements document and relate
that process to techniques in requirements engineering. The
system requirements document presents a calibration point
for future security requirements engineering techniques in-
tended to meet both functional and assurance goals.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sometimes an organization possesses information of such a
critical nature that its inappropriate exposure or modica-
tion would cause grave damage to the enterprise. Because
networked computer systems are now used to store and man-
age this sort of highly sensitive information, management
may seek assurances that those computers and networks
cannot be misused in ways that result in lapses of security
policy enforcement that would expose the organization to
unacceptable risk. Malicious software has long been under-
stood to be a signicant threat to information security [41].
Multilevel secure systems are intended to control the shar-
ing of highly sensitive information in the face of malicious
software in a manner commensurate with policies relating
to information condentiality and integrity [13].
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be
construed to reflect those of their employers or the Department of Defense.
High assurance computers and networks are intended for the
protection of critical information resources in environments
that involve access by individuals with a range of authoriza-
tions to enterprise information. A high assurance system is
intended to be an implementation of the Reference Monitor
Concept [7], a notion that describes the ideal security policy
enforcement mechanism. This ideal has three characteris-
tics. First, it is always invoked to perform its enforcement
duties. Second, attackers cannot successfully penetrate the
mechanism and thus cause it to fail. Finally, it is small
enough to ensure that it will, in fact, correctly enforce pol-
icy and that it contains no artices that might be used to
neutralize the policy enforcement mechanism. One objec-
tive of high assurance security engineering is to address the
threat of system subversion [26]. Examples of system sub-
version abound in commercial software as is evident from
web sites devoted to Easter Eggs [5]. That subversion can
be cleverly implemented so as to make it virtually impossible
to detect was amply illustrated by Thompson [38].
A high assurance system is a real instance that approaches
the Reference Monitor Concept ideal through a rigorous se-
curity engineering process. Its development may begin with
the capture of the security policy to be enforced and an in-
terpretation of that policy in terms of a computer system.
This may produce a formal security policy model and subse-
quent evidence that policy enforcement objectives are met.
In parallel with that formal approach, the engineering team
will develop a series of specications that will move from
high level requirements to detailed implementation docu-
ments and code. The system requirements specication is
the most abstract of this latter set of documents. A system
requirements specication for a secure system will incorpo-
rate security consideration in conjunction with all other re-
quirements. Such a requirements document provides a good
example for those studying security requirements concerns.
In many cases, the design and development of high assur-
ance secure systems has taken place behind closed doors [30,
3, 32]. Although these systems may have been evaluated un-
der the guidelines of various criteria intended to assess their
security functionality and lifecycle assurance, little docu-
mentation is available for public scrutiny beyond the nal
evaluation reports published at the end of the evaluation
process. The actual documents produced during system de-
sign and development remain cloaked in proprietary secrecy
and government constraints and non-disclosure agreements.
Three of the authors of this paper have been members of
engineering teams whose work resulted in the design and
implementation of a commercially available highly trusted
secure system [32]. Since entering a less restrictive envi-
ronment, we and our collaborators have embarked on the
development of a high assurance network that relies upon
commercial-o-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software to
present the user interface. This paper is intended to describe
the general method used to develop the high level require-
ments specications for a high condence secure system.
Using our MLS LAN System Requirements Document (see
Appendix) for the high assurance multilevel secure local area
network as a backdrop and example, we will outline the
steps needed to move from an intuitive, ad hoc notion of
the system requirements to a coherent document that can
be used for more detailed system specications and design.
The security requirements specication captures not only
the system's functional requirements but the non-functional
requirements as well.
The remainder of this paper is organized to illustrate our re-
quirements development method. To put the requirements
specication process in the proper context, background in-
formation about the multilevel secure LAN will be provided
in Section 2. Techniques used to create the specication will
be discussed in Section 3 with reference to Appendix A, an
image of the requirements specication document. This sec-
tion will present our multi-dimensional threat model as well
as the method we used to develop the specication. Some
general observations about high assurance security require-
ments specications and recommendations for process im-
provement follow in Section 4. Our presentation concludes
in Section 4.2 with a summary.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE MULTILEVEL
SECURE LAN
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Multilevel Secure Lo-
cal Area Network (MLS LAN) project [21, 16, 15, 8] is an
eort to develop a high assurance LAN that leverages COTS
components. The project was driven by two overarching re-
quirements. The rst was to protect security-critical infor-
mation from unauthorized disclosure or modication. The
second was to provide users with the ability to use popu-
lar COTS oce productivity tools to organize and manage
information at authorized sensitivity levels.
To achieve these objectives, we undertook the design and de-
velopment of a prototype infrastructure for applications: a
local area network that incorporated both high assurance se-
curity policy enforcement mechanisms and COTS software
and hardware platforms for users' desktops. The former
was intended to leverage the considerable government in-
vestment in highly trusted systems, while the latter objec-
tive resulted from the realization that unless a secure system
oered users the same sort of convenient interfaces users had
come to expect when handling normal information, the se-












Figure 1: NPS Multilevel Secure LAN Architecture
The NPS MLS LAN project is intended to be a system that
can provide controlled sharing of labeled information while
permitting users to access that information through popular
PC-based COTS personal and oce productivity applica-
tions. Its architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 [15].
The high assurance server enforces the security policy and
controls access to information. It is the core trusted comput-
ing base (TCB) for the distributed system. Application pro-
tocols run on the High assurance server and provide services
and access to shared resources. Each PC is to be equipped
with a trusted computing base extension (TCBE) plug-in
board that will provide TCB support at the workstation.
From these clients, users log on to the TCB, establishing an
identity for audit and access control purposes. The TCB
components, either the high assurance server base or the
TCB extensions, were the only components directly con-
nected to the physical network. Individual components are
discussed below.
2.1 Trusted Servers
Each Trusted Server consists of the high assurance TCB,
which enforces critical security policy, and untrusted appli-
cation server instances (viz. one per security level per user)
constrained by the TCB. The server supports sharing and
labeling and is functionally equivalent in terms of overall
application-level protocol support to a COTS application
server for the particular protocol it is providing. Thus, it is
compatible with existing COTS client packages.
Among the application servers we have adapted to the high
assurance environment are: Internet Mail Access Protocol
(IMAP) [2] based on a port of the University of Washington
IMAP server [17], Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) pro-
viding an Apache-based port [11], and Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol (SMTP) based upon sendmail [14]. The servers
required little or no code modication to be adapted to the
multilevel environment. With a proper conguration, users
can view information at or below their current session levels.
2.2 High Assurance Base
The Wang XTS-300 provides our high assurance base [31].
This TCB, by virtue of the protection domains it creates,
provides condence that malicious code will neither cause
the exltration of sensitive data nor the corruption of in-
formation of higher integrity. Thus, one has condence of
correct security policy enforcement.
The high assurance server is dened by the broad properties
needed for a viable commercial product. Our denition of
a high assurance base is a TCB on the Evaluated Products
List (EPL) [1] with a Class B3 or higher digraph based upon
an evaluation against the Trusted Computing System Eval-
uation Criteria (TCSEC) [28] or its network interpretation
[29], or equivalent Common Criteria requirements [4].
Modications to XTS-300 TCB networking interfaces con-
tribute to the support of the following desired functions: (1)
a trusted path between client workstations and the XTS-300,
(2) session-level negotiation at the XTS-300 from the client
workstations, and (3) single-level session communications on
the Ethernet for client workstations at dierent session lev-
els. Our modications permit multiple clients at dierent
access classes to communicate with the server through a
single physical network device [15].
2.3 Client Workstations
Client workstations are typical COTS PCs hosting a popular
commercial operating system and a commercial application
suite. For mail services the clients include: Lotus Notes,
Outlook, Pine, Postal, and Netscape
1
. A typical browser
supports the client interface to web pages.
To insure that object reuse requirements would be met,
workstations are considered to be, in eect, \diskless," with
sucient volatile RAM-disk capability to support a wide
variety of user applications. The workstation TCB exten-
sion will satisfy object reuse requirements by ensuring that
RAM and other volatile primary and secondary storage at
the workstation are purged with each change of session level
or new user login at the workstation.
2.4 Trusted Computing Base Extension
To extend the TCB across the network, the architecture
includes a trusted computing base extension (TCBE) at each
COTS workstation [19, 8, 39]. This component is planned
to provide the following services:
 A secure attention key (SAK) that permits users to
establish unambiguous communication with the high
assurance TCB for unspoofable presentation and cap-
ture of security critical data at the user interface.
 Non-bypassable, controlled access to the LAN.
 Protected communication channels between the TCB
and the TCBE. These protected communications are
based upon protocols that support both the establish-
ment and maintenance of a trusted path, and session-
level communications.
 Mechanisms to ensure high assurance object reuse at
the client PC for both primary and secondary stor-
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These application names: Lotus Notes, Outlook, and
Netscape, are trademarked by their respective owners.
age. Experiments by Agacayak [6] indicate that this is
possible from an add-on card.
 Control of the client and its resources at the time of
boot and control over security critical actions through-
out the client session.
We concluded that a carefully written and reviewed system
requirements document was needed to guide the develop-
ment of the system architecture and various communications
protocols needed in the trusted LAN.
3. REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION
In this section we will provide some insights into our system
requirements specication process. The motivation for the
process is described. Functional and non-functional require-
ments are discussed. Our multidimensional threat model is
presented. Finally we describe our requirements specica-
tion method.
3.1 Motivation and Objectives
A principal motivation for producing a system requirements
specication was to provide focus for a complex eort. As
we began exploring the design of a group of distributed
mechanisms that had to result in coherent enforcement of
the network security policy, it became clear that unless we
had the same conceptual system as a goal, the result might
be ineective. In order to create a functional specication
from which we could proceed, a requirements document that
could be shared among all members of the engineering team
was needed.
Another driver for the process was the desire to have a tool
that would permit us to be able to judge when we were
done building the LAN. The students were particularly con-
cerned about requirements drift and requirements ination
[12] that might have created a Sisyphean task. The require-
ments specication also allowed us to examine the system
in the abstract to determine whether some essential element
had been omitted.
Several of us viewed requirements specication development
for high assurance secure systems as a social process within
the context of a larger engineering design and development
eort and wanted to teach this aspect of high assurance
system requirements specication to a new generation. We
are not aware of any books or tools that can convey the
social and interactive nature of this process as well as a
\laboratory exercise".
The objective of the requirements specication process was
to produce a high level yet rigorous description of system
behavior that is both complete, consistent, and well formed.
Our project objective was to produce a framework for an en-
abling technology to both support desired user applications
and enforce the security policy. The requirements speci-
cation describes what we are trying to do, not how we are
going to do it.
3.2 Functional and Non-Functional Security
Requirements
Some state very broadly that all security requirements are
non-functional [27, 40]. It has been suggested that func-
tions implement system state changes and that functional
requirements dene how those functions will behave and
what states can be reached [33]. In this case, certain secu-
rity requirements are functional, as they aect changes in
state. Consider for example an attempt to gain access in a
system enforcing a mandatory condentiality policy. Mod-
els for implemented systems [9, 10] describe system state
changes while preserving system security properties. While
the state of the system is being functionally transformed,
non-functional requirements ensure that a set of orthogonal
system properties are maintained.
To illustrate the nature of functional and non-functional
requirements, consider two systems: a system enforcing a
mandatory condentiality policy (designated SECURE) and
a system to automate trac lights (designated TRAFFIC).
Table 1 illustrates a few requirements for each. For the traf-
c light system, the requirement that the trac light turns
yellow after it has been green for three minutes is a state
changing requirement and is functional. The accuracy of
the clock that must be used to measure when three minutes
have elapsed presents a non-functional, non-state changing
requirement. For the secure system, users must present a
valid password in order to log in to the system. This is a
requirement which must be met in order for a state change
from user-logged-on to user-logged-in to occur. Similarly,
the requirement that secret information be stored in objects
labeled SECRET aects whether information can move from
an unstored to a stored state. In contrast, the requirement
for the accumulation of an audit trail recording all access at-
tempts does not aect system state. When access attempts
succeed, state changes and when they fail state is unchanged.
In either case, an audit record is generated.




A user shall present a valid
password in order to log in
to the system.
SECURE
Secret information shall be
stored in objects labeled SE-
CRET.
SECURE
The trac light shall turn
yellow after it has been
green for three minutes.
TRAFFIC
Non-Functional
Audit records shall be
recorded for all access
attempts.
SECURE
The accuracy of the clock
shall be to within ve sec-
onds.
TRAFFIC
Thus we conclude that the construction of a high assurance
system intended to enforce national security policy imposes
both functional and non-functional requirements on a sys-
tem. However, our requirements specication is not orga-
nized to distinguish functional from non-functional security
requirements.
3.3 Threat Model
The system requirements specication is motivated by var-
ious classes of threats. Starting with an understanding of
the elements of the engineering process [12, 37], we needed
to understand how our threat model could best be repre-
sented and addressed. Figure 2 illustrates our modication
to the requirements process. An understanding of the threat
model within the system's developmental and operational
domains will drive system requirements. As stated in Sec-
tion 2, the objective of the system was to enforce a policy
regarding the disclosure and modication of sensitive infor-
mation. Availability was not a primary concern, as is re-







Figure 2: Requirements Process
The threats to be addressed are of two kinds, representing
the domains of concern. Developmental threats form the
rst major class of threats to the TCB. These are threats
to the ability of the system to fulll its requirements. There
are many design and implementation mistakes that can oc-
cur during a standard software development project [23].
The threat of subversion [26] is a major concern in the de-
velopment of secure systems as the objective is to construct
a system that is self protecting [36]. To counter mistakes due
to poor engineering, we use a rigorous engineering process.
To counter subversion, we use conguration management
and quality assurance.
Development threats are illustrated in Figure 3. Interfaces
to the TCB are shown and threats utilizing those inter-
faces are illustrated in hexagons. These threats include both
physical and non-physical attacks. It is worth noting that
adequate conguration management and quality assurance
can mitigate many physical threats during the system de-
velopment phase. Additional measures to address physical
threats include traditional disaster recovery methods [34]
such as: re and earthquake protection, o-site backups,
and locked oces and laboratories.
A comprehensive framework is needed during the develop-
ment phase of a secure system to counter developmental
threats. Requirements specication for this framework are
beyond the scope of the example in Appendix A, but some
guidance for high assurance development appears in stan-
dard evaluation criteria [28, 4].
Although our developmental threat model is principally con-
cerned with eliminating subversion that would aect the
ability of the system to enforce its condentiality and in-
tegrity policies, a benet of good engineering and of the
conguration management and quality assurance process is
the reduction of possible aws that might result in denial of
service from within the TCB itself.
TCB Interfaces












Figure 3: Development Threats
The second, and more obvious, class of threats is operational
threats. These are the threats that the system is designed
to counter and that come to mind when one thinks of sys-
tem security. In the case of the MLS LAN, a high assur-
ance multilevel system, the threats fall into three classes:
network threats, malicious software, and misbehavior. Net-
work threats are attacks to the communications protocols
within the LAN. For example, an attempt could be made
to use a non-TCBE equipped workstation attached to the
LAN to modify or collect communications trac. Malicious
software is the principal operational threat to the server.
This software would attempt to violate security policies for
information condentiality or integrity by obtaining unau-
thorized access to information. Trojan Horse software repre-
sents a classic example of malicious software and can be used
to either directly or indirectly access information [22].Mis-
behavior applies to the MLS LAN Workstation where both
user actions and malicious software may be used as attack
paths. In this case, either users or software attempt to nul-
lify the TCB Extension in order to gain unauthorized access
to protected information.
We further decompose the operational threats into software
threats and physical threats. Figure 4 illustrates the sys-
tem of interest, i.e., the trusted computing base (TCB), its
interfaces, and the operational software threats to the sys-
tem by external elements that will drive the requirements
specication. Thus the TCB is the internal system. Its
interfaces are to the communications protocols, application
proctol server, and MLS LAN Workstation. (A direct cor-
respondence between Figure 4 and the second gure of the
requirements document ( MLS LAN Component Overview)
can be observed.) External threats are network attacks, ma-
licious software and misbehavior. The requirements docu-
ment, when complete, addresses these threats. For example
in the requirements document, the section on MLS LAN
Connection Protocol Requirements addresses mitigation of
















Figure 4: Operational Software Threats
An often neglected aspect of system lifecycle management
that requires attention is that of physical access to and tam-
pering with the system. For example, if an individual were
to break the seals on the XTS-300 or the TCBE and re-
place the chip containing the BIOS, this would render the
system insecure. Added to the usual conguration manage-
ment concerns was that of physical protection of the elded
trusted system components. Thus, physical threats comple-
ment software threats to the operational system, and are
illustrated in Figure 5. The TCB and its interfaces are the
same, but the external threats are tampering with the com-
munications lines, and TCB components, i.e., the XTS-300
or the TCB Extensions.
In summary, our threat model accounts for the developmen-
tal and operational stages of system evolution and for each
stage accounts for both physical and non-physical threats.
It is clear that denial of service is not addressed by the
threat model for this project; however, the customer objec-
tive was not the enforcement of an availability policy. Noth-
ing will prevent a user from monopolizing workstation re-
sources; aws in commercial workstation operating systems
or applications or in server software could result in loss of
availability; and physical attacks such as cutting commu-
nications links or destroying computers are guaranteed to
deny service.
3.4 Method
Using a requirements specication format [20], we started
with a skeletal requirements specication and lled in sec-
tions. Often we found that requirements from one section
would aect decisions associated with another aspect of the
system. Thus the requirements specication process was it-























Figure 5: Operational Physical Threats
We used a two-level waterfall process [35] to ensure that the
requirements specication was realistic. After completing
what appeared to be a reasonable draft of the system re-
quirements specication, we moved to the development of a
specication for various communications protocols and pro-
tection mechanisms of the distributed TCB. (Drafts of both
the requirements specication and the functional specica-
tion appeared as appendicies to a student thesis [42].) This
was a much more detailed and concrete design statement
that provided insights into the implementation details we
were working toward. Those realities fed back into the sys-
tem requirements document in interesting ways.
1. Design decisions gone awry sometimes indicated the
need for a guiding principle at the requirements level.
2. Fundamental requirements statements moved out of
design and up to requirements.
3. Conict with real world possibilities resulted in clari-
cation or renement at the requirements level.
Concurrent development of a functional specication allowed
us to identify notions that were generalizable and could be
abstracted for inclusion in the requirements document. Con-
versely, items more appropriate for the functional specica-
tion were removed from the requirements document. For
the less experienced members of the team, the temptation
to include implementation details is enormous. It is fun
to think about the implementation and harder to describe
the abstract system. On the other hand, feedback from the
more detailed design phase plays a key role. This feedback
approach permitted us to develop documents that would be
suitable for evolutionary engineering processes [24, 25] as
experiential or environmental factors lead to requirements
for new versions of the system.
Abstraction is one of the principal objectives of a high level
requirements specication and one of the most dicult to
achieve. Although our specication is intentionally abstract
it is not intended to be vague, but instead semantically pre-
cise. There should be no ambiguity with respect to require-
ments that the system absolutely had to meet. In addition,
the specication should be suciently abstract that a variety
of implementations could satisfy the requirements [33]. For
example, our specication states in Section 3.2.1.1 that \the
TCB shall provide a Secure Attention Key (SAK) mecha-
nism to invoke a trusted path from workstations to which
the TCB has been extended." Nowhere is there a statement
regarding how that SAK is to be implemented: that is the
purview of the design team. It could be invoked from a
keyboard using a combination of keys such as \CTRL-ALT-
DEL" or it could be invoked using a special button.
Another aspect of the system that is abstracted away is the
functionality associated with the applications. They are rel-
evant to the framework under consideration only in so far as
they impose requirements for support from the network in
the form of resources for processing capability, memory and
network bandwidth.
A key part of the process of developing the requirements
specication involved recognition of implementation details.
Through a process of winnowing, we were able to avoid inclu-
sion of the implementation details. Some detailed descrip-
tions were transferred to nascent design documents; some
discarded; and others were generalized and abstracted to
become true requirements. For example, instead of stating
what application protocol services were to be supported, the
specication states in Section 3.1.3 that \the MLS LAN shall
provide...application protocol services ...".
A fundamental concept for requirements development is that
of completeness. In reviewing progress and draft versions,
tests for completeness can include gedanken exercises, such
as: \Can a useless or insecure system be built to this ab-
stract specication?" A mapping of the requirements speci-
cation to the threat models is used to ensure that all threats
are accounted for. The individual and group reviews en-
sured that these questions were asked regularly throughout
the requirements development process.
3.4.1 Social Process in Requirements Specification
Members of our specication team represented multiple stake
holders. The most senior members of the team represented
the customers, while junior members of the group repre-
sented those whose task would be system implementation.
Ultimately, system implementation is the job of the entire
team, however during the specication process, it is neces-
sary to consider the perspectives of a larger set of individu-
als. The customer must be represented because if ignored,
the system might become an amusing sandbox for imple-
mentation team experimentation, yet the likelihood that it
would actually be used would be substantially reduced. The
engineering team must be represented because this is the
group that must be able to move from the abstract specica-
tion to a concrete implementation. Certiers and accreditors
must be represented because they are the ones responsible
for attesting that the implementation is faithful to the spec-
ication. Various sets of system users are represented and
include typical users, operators, and administrators. Our
experience was that the active participation of all stakehold-
ers helped to ensure that the specication was well balanced
with respect to the various and sometimes conicting views
of these stakeholders.
For several months we met on a weekly basis to discuss each
new draft of the document. This type of teamwork is best
achieved in an environment in which criticism is viewed not
as a subjective attack on the writer but as an objective,
scientic attempt to achieve the best possible result. As
the team matured criticism was accepted and members with
strengths in particular areas were able to contribute to the
emerging document.
The team approach adds to the assurance of the resulting
system and mitigates development threats. Because a group
of system architects inspected the documents and discussed
its semantics, the addition of a subversive artifact during the
design stage is considerably more dicult [26]. This threat
is directly addressed by way of the project's conguration
management and quality assurance system.
3.4.2 Implicit Requirements
Inspection of the MLS LAN System Requirements Docu-
ment shows that a number of the functional requirements are
quite general. The system must support application proto-
cols, but it is not necessary to specify which protocols. The
system must support inexpensive commercial PCs as user
workstations. It must support up-to-date versions of com-
mercial operating systems. It follows implicitly that client
applications can be up-to-date. The latter two requirements
encompass not only a requirement for immediate system per-
formance, but also one for adaptability in that both the
COTS operating system and the applications it supports
must be upgradable at any time.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
When attempting to build a high assurance system, the ob-
jective is to provide a high level of condence that security
policy will be correctly and continuously enforced. Mini-
mization has been recognized as an eective means of ensur-
ing that the system can be judged for correctness and com-
pleteness [18]. In a minimized system we ask two questions.
First, are all components within the system boundary, i.e.,
the Trusted Computing Base perimeter, necessary for the
correct enforcement of security policy, and, second, are the
mechanisms organized such that they are sucient for secu-
rity policy enforcement. If additional functionality is added
to the secure system, then additional eort will be required
to demonstrate that the result meets the assurance require-
ments. The task in developing a requirements document is
to restrict the design of the system by providing sucient
detail so that system specications are well focused.
4.1 A Calibration Point
Over the past decade there has been signicant work in the
area of requirements engineering [40] and new eorts are un-
derway to extend these achievements to the area of security
requirements engineering. What metric is to be applied to
judge the eectiveness of these new security requirements
engineering techniques? Will those requirements be su-
ciently abstract to permit the development of a wide range
of system implementations? Will those requirements intro-
duce restrictions that will facilitate the development of sys-
tem specications and other documents [33]? The require-
ments document provided here is a worked example in that
it has provided both the abstraction and restrictions neces-
sary to shorten the eort required to specify and construct
a high assurance multilevel system. Thus, our specication
can provide a calibration point for new techniques in re-
quirements engineering.
4.2 Conclusions
This paper has presented a case study in the development
of a requirements document for a multilevel secure system
that must meet stringent assurance requirements. The sys-
tem is secure, yet combines popular commercial components
with specialized high assurance ones. We described secu-
rity objectives as having both functional and non-functional
requirements. A multi-dimensional threat model that ac-
counts for developmental and operational phases of system
evolution and considers both physical and non-physical threats
has been presented. Explicit consideration of physical threats
to the system are addressed in the requirements engineer-
ing process. We have described our team-based approach
to system specication and design. By assuming the views
of various stakeholders in the system, through open, non-
judgemental discourse, and by using the threat model and
the high level design specications as a check, we have de-
veloped an abstract requirements specication. The speci-
cation of the NPS MLS LAN provides a worked example of
a requirements document for a high assurance secure system
and thus may be unique in the open literature. Our speci-
cation can be used as a calibration point for future security
requirements engineering techniques intended to meet both
functional and assurance goals.
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APPENDIX
A. MLS LAN SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
DOCUMENT - VERSION 0.2
A.1 Introduction
A.1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this System Requirements Document is to
dene the design requirements for the Naval Postgraduate
School Center for InfoSec Studies and Research (CISR) Mul-
tilevel Secure Local Area Network (MLS LAN) Project.
A.1.2 Scope
This requirements document provides extensive information
concerning the design requirements for each of the com-
ponents of the MLS LAN project. It outlines the man-
dated system goals perceived for successful completion of
the project and the development of an operational multi-
level secure local area network. It is understood that some
of the specied requirements are designated as mandatory
to fulll near-term functionality and are to be addressed in
the initial design. Other requirements, where annotated, are
considered to be future goals and are recorded to support
long-range design specications. This requirements docu-
ment is intended to provide sucient detail and content to
assist the design team in specication denition.
A.2 System Overview
A.2.1 MLS LAN System Overview
The MLS LAN Project is an eort to provide government
and commercial organizations with a cost eective, multi-
level, easy-to-use oce environment leveraging existing high
assurance technology [Ref. 1]. The goals of the project are to
produce a networking environment that provides concurrent
high assurance access for network users to data at multiple
sensitivity levels through the incorporation of inexpensive
commercial personal computers.
The proposed systems architecture for the MLS LAN is
based on the use of the Wang Government Services Incor-
porated XTS-300(tm) Class B3 rated server. [Ref. 2] The
XTS-300 provides both mandatory and discretionary access
controls, which \allow separation of users who are at dif-
ferent clearance levels, and prevents a lower level user from
reading a higher level user's les or data". [Ref. 3] In accor-
dance with the TCSEC Class B3 rating requirements, the
XTS-300 establishes a \Trusted Computing Base" (TCB)
that contains all of the Trusted Software Commands, the
TCB System Services (TSS), and the Security Kernel. It
is the last that implements the TCSEC dened Reference
Monitor concept in the XTS-300 [Ref 4]. The MLS LAN
incorporates a \logically isolated and unmistakably distin-
guishable" trusted communications path between the server
and its clients through development of a Trusted Computing
Base Extension (TCBE). The TCBE will provide a trusted
network interface entity for veriable expansion of the TCB
over the communications path to the client workstation.
The current hardware solution for the TCBE is to be devel-
oped using the Intel I960jx or comparable processor. The
TCBE will dominate all actions of the untrusted worksta-
tion and allow connectivity into the High Assurance LAN
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Figure 2.1 MLS LAN Component Overview
A.2.2 MLS LAN User Description
The MLS LAN user is any operator, regardless of authenti-
cation, who accesses MLS LAN resources or network func-
tionality. A TCB Authenticated user is one who has success-
fully established a TCB-to-User connection and been vali-
dated by the TCB for operations within the MLS LAN. A
Non-TCB Authenticated User, which is a future require-
ment, is one who has not been validated by the TCB. Ac-
countability of Non-TCB Authenticated Users shall be pro-
vided using existing commercial authentication and identi-
cation mechanisms.
A.2.3 Component Descriptions
The MLS LAN is comprised of three components (Fig 2.1).
The principal component is the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB), which provides an xed security perimeter for MLS
LAN operations. Network functionality for access to avail-
able application software, le transfer, electronic mail, or
remote printing is provided by the Network Application Pro-
tocol Services. Finally, the MLS LAN requires a workstation
that acts as an agent for the User to access any required net-
work functionality.
A.2.3.1 Trusted Computing Base
The Trusted Computing Base is an abstraction for the col-
lection of elements of a computer system that pertain to the
security policy. Its aegis encompasses all policy enforcement
mechanisms, any auditing (retrieval and analysis), identi-
cation and authentication, and the interface for security
administration.
A.2.3.1.1 Trusted Computing Base Services
The services provided by the MLS LAN to establish a Class
B3 rated Trusted Computing Base were outlined in section
2.1 \MLS LAN System Overview". To extend this TCB
securely to users additional services are required.
A.2.3.1.2 TCBE Extension Server
The use of the XTS-300 High Assurance Server enables the
MLS LAN to place a trusted daemon process in the Operat-
ing System Services (OSS) Domain that can provide the pro-
tection and communications protocols necessary to establish
a trusted path between the workstation and MLS LAN. This
\Server" process is used to extend the TCB perimeter se-
curely over the network to the requesting TCBE-equipped
workstation. This \Server" process will provide the follow-
ing functionality: user identication and authentication, ses-
sion negotiation, session activation, and session termination.
[Ref 6.]
A.2.3.1.3 Secure Session Server
The Secure Session Server is an additional trusted daemon
\Server" process contained in the OSS. This process will
only accept incoming Network Application Protocol Service
requests from workstations/users that have established a
session via the trusted path and the TCB Extension Server.
Validated requests will be passed on to untrusted Applica-
tion Protocol Servers, operating on behalf of the user, at the
user's negotiated session sensitivity level [Ref 6.]
(Future Requirement) The Secure Session Server will accept
Network Application Protocol Services requests from work-
station/users that have not established a session, viz. Non-
TCB Authenticated Users. These requests will be passed
on to untrusted Application Protocol Servers, operating as
a system dened anonymous user, at a system dened low




















Figure 3.1  TCB Layering Abstractions
A.2.3.1.4 MLS LAN Session Database Server
The MLS LAN requires a trusted database to maintain all
pertinent information concerning each unique TCB session
connection. The Session Database Server must provide pro-
tection for trusted \read" functionality from all TCB entities
and \write" functionality from the TCB Extension Server.
A.2.3.1.5 Trusted Computing Base Extension
The Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) is a hardware-
based computer subsystem that is embedded into the MLS
LAN workstation. The TCBE provides the MLS LAN with
a veriable high assurance entity that can be used to extend
the TCB.
A.2.3.1.6 MLS LAN Connection Protocols
The MLS LAN connection protocols dene the parameters
for initiation, security and communications establishment
between two or more components of the MLS LAN.
A.2.3.2 Network Application Protocol Services
The MLS LAN uses the TCP/IP stack to support numer-
ous Application Layer Protocol services such as Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Internet Message Access Proto-
col (IMAP), and File Transfer Protocol (FTP). These ser-
vices are provided to the users through Application Protocol
Servers (APS). While use of these application services are
considered \untrusted" and external to the TCB, their ac-
cess is controlled strictly through the Secure Session Server
allowing access to data of multiple sensitivity levels.
A.2.4 MLS LAN
The MLS LAN workstations are the network computers em-
ployed by the user to access MLS LAN resources and net-
work functionality.
A.3 System Requirements
A.3.1 MLS LAN Requirements
A.3.1.1
The MLS LAN shall support multiple simultaneous work-
station connections.
A.3.1.2
The MLS LAN shall support simultaneous high assurance
access for unique workstations operating at dierent sensi-
tivity levels.
A.3.1.3
The MLS LAN shall provide access to shared resources, ap-
plication protocol services, and popular application prod-
ucts for both TCB Authenticated Users and, in the future,
Non-TCB Authenticated Users.
A.3.1.4
The MLS LAN shall provide high assurance connectivity to
application protocols that give access to multiple levels of
data in accordance with security policies.
A.3.2 Trusted Computing Base Requirements
This section elaborates on the requirements for the TCB in
total. The overall requirements are germane to each of the
sub-components while their specic requirements are con-
tained in subsequent sections. A abstract depiction of the
MLS LAN layering is provided in Figure 3.1.
A.3.2.1 TCB Overall Requirements
A.3.2.1.1
The TCB shall provide a Secure Attention Key (SAK)mech-
anism to invoke a trusted path from workstations to which
the TCB has been extended.
A.3.2.1.2
The TCB shall establish a trusted path communications con-
nection between network users and the Trusted Comput-
ing Base. This trusted path shall be established for initial
session authentication purposes, such as \login" or for any
specied user operations that require a trusted path, such as
\logout", \set session level", downgrade, change user pass-
word, etc.
A.3.2.1.3
Once the session has been established, the TCB shall not al-
low the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol Channel to be broken with-
out loss of network functionality with respect to shared re-
sources, protocol services and applications provided by the
MLS LAN.
A.3.2.1.4
The TCB shall allow the user to change the current session
sensitivity-level up to the congured maximum for that user.
A.3.2.1.5
The TCB shall provide assurance that the security policy
will be enforced in the presence of malicious software.
A.3.2.1.6
The TCB shall provide protection against disclosure and
modication of information on all communications channels
used by the network.
A.3.2.1.7
The TCB shall control access all devices and networks ex-
ternal to the MLS LAN.
A.3.2.1.8
(Future Requirement) The TCB shall limit the allowable
session sensitivity-level to the greatest lower bound between
the user's clearance and the TCBE security rating.
A.3.2.2 Trusted Computing Base Extension Require-
ments
A.3.2.2.1
The TCBE shall support the use of Trusted Path commu-
nications with the TCB for security related operations.
A.3.2.2.2
The TCBE shall prevent data retention between session se-
curity levels and support proper object reuse.
A.3.2.2.3
The TCBE shall support a hardware mechanism that has
the ability to purge all memory between session security
levels.
A.3.2.2.4
The TCBE shall maintain the ability to reset the host com-
puter system.
A.3.2.2.5
The TCBE shall support the use of a secure attention key.
A.3.2.2.6
The TCBE shall control the information ow into and out
of the host computer system.
A.3.2.3 MLS LAN Connection Protocol Requirements
A.3.2.3.1
The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol that supports both
the establishment of a secure interaction communications
channel and the mutual authentication between two TCB
entities. This protocol will be known as the \Protected
Communications Channel (PCC) Protocol". This protocol
will establish the security conduit through which all other
MLS LAN protocols operate.
A.3.2.3.2
The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to support commu-
nications between a TCBE equipped workstation and the
TCB Extension Server. This protocol will be known as the
\TCB-to-TCBE Protocol".
A.3.2.3.3
The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to support the secure
transfer of information from the TCB Extension Server to
the Session Database Server to initialize or modify the data
maintained on each User Session. This protocol will addi-
tionally support the query by a TCB Entity to the Session
Database Server for information concerning a User Session.
This protocol will be known as the Session Status Protocol.
A.3.2.3.4
The MLS LAN shall provide a protocol to support a TCBE
equipped workstation connection to a MLS LAN Secure Ses-
sion Server. This protocol is the conduit for application pro-
tocols and will be known as the \TCBE-to-Session Server
Protocol".
A.3.2.3.5
(Future Requirement) The MLS LAN shall provide a pro-
tocol to support the connection of a workstation that is not
using TCBE services to an untrusted Application Protocol
Server, e.g., INTERNET or WWW.
A.3.2.3.6
(Future Requirement) The MLS LAN shall provide a pro-
tocol to support a connection of a workstation that is not
using TCBE services to a MLS LAN Application Protocol
Server.
A.3.3 MLS LAN Network Application Protocol Ser-
vices Requirements.
A.3.3.1
The MLS LAN shall support multiple simultaneous accesses
to higher layer application protocols, e.g., HTTP, IMAP or
FTP.
A.3.3.2
The MLS LAN Application Protocol Servers shall provide
access to shared network resources, and popular application
products for TCB authenticated users.
A.3.3.3
Access to data maintained on the MLS LAN Applications
Protocol Servers (APS) shall be controlled the through the
TCB in accordance with the security policy.
A.3.3.4
(Future Requirement) The MLS LAN Application Protocol
Servers shall provide access to shared network resources, and
popular application products for Non-TCB authenticated
users.
A.3.4 MLS LAN Workstation Requirements
A.3.4.1
The MLS LAN shall support the use of two congurations
of inexpensive commercial personal computers:
A.3.4.1.1
Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) equipped.
A.3.4.1.2
(Future Requirement) Non-TCBE equipped.
A.3.5
The MLS LAN Workstations shall support up-to-date com-
mercial operating systems.
A.3.6
The MLS LAN TCBE Equipped Workstation shall be [in
eect] \diskless thin-client" computers operating under the
control of the TCBE.
A.4 MLS LAN System Restrictions
A.4.1 MLS LAN Restrictions
A.4.1.1
The MLS LAN shall support no more than one logged in
user per workstation at a time.
A.4.2 Environmental Restrictions
A.4.2.1
The TCB platform shall not be subjected to physical tam-
pering.
A.4.2.2
The TCBE hardware shall not be subjected to physical tam-
pering.
A. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Deni-
tions
Abbreviations, Acronyms
APS - Application Protocol Server
CISR - Center for INFOSEC Studies and Research
FTP - File Transfer Protocol
HTTP - Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IMAP - Internet Message Access Protocol
LAN - Local Area Network
MLS - Multilevel Secure
NPS - Naval Postgraduate School
OSS - Operating System Services
SAK - Secure Attention Key
TCB - Trusted Computing Base
TCBE - Trusted Computing Base Extension
TIC - Trusted Interaction Channel
TSS - TCB System Services
TCSEC - Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria
Denitions
Trusted Computing Base: The Trusted Computing Base
is dened as \The totality of protection mechanisms
within a computer system - including hardware, rmware,
and software - the combination of which is responsible
for enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one
or more components that together enforce a unied se-
curity policy over a product or system. The ability of a
trusted computing base to correctly enforce a security
policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the
TCB and on the correct input by system administra-
tive personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance)
related to the security policy" [Ref 4.]
Trusted Path: The Trusted Path is dened as \A mech-
anism by which a person at a terminal can communi-
cate directly with the Trusted Computing Base. This
mechanism can only be activated by the person or the
Trusted Computing Base and cannot be imitated by
untrusted software." [Ref 4.]
Session: A Session is dened as the period of interaction
between a user and entities within the MLS LAN fol-
lowing session activation and until session termination.
Sessions are established or denied based upon based on
\attributes such as the location or port or access, the
user's security attribute (e.g., identity, clearance level,
integrity level, membership in a role), ranges of time
(e.g., time-of-day, day-of-week, calendar dates) or com-
binations of parameters." Limitations may be placed
upon user active sessions such as limitations of the
number of multiple concurrent sessions or session lock-
ing based upon inactivity. [Ref 5.]
TCB Authenticated User: A TCB Authenticated user
is one who has successfully established a TCB-to-User
connection and been validated by the TCB for opera-
tions within the MLS LAN.
Non-TCB Authenticated User: A Non-TCB Authenti-
cated user is one who has not been validated by the
TCB.
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